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Abstract
The 1987 Constitution of Korea explicitly stipulates the principle of due process in criminal 
procedures and provides very detailed Bill of Rights provisions regarding criminal procedural 
rights. This “constitutionalization of criminal procedure” has brought significant changes in the 
theory and practice of the Korean criminal procedure. Exclusionary rules are in the middle of 
this “revolution”. The Korean judiciary and legislature that experienced the dark age of 
procedural rights under the long authoritarian rule chose to adopt the exclusionary rules as a 
useful tool to deter police misconduct. 
Firstly, this paper starts by reviewing the terrible situation under the authoritarian regime 
of Korea and the legal change after democratization. Secondly, focusing on the landmark judicial 
decisions and legislations including the Criminal Procedure Code and the Communication 
Privacy Protection Act, it examines three categories of exclusions: the exclusion of incriminating 
statements obtained in the process of illegal arrest or interrogation, communications by illegal 
wiretapping and physical evidences obtained by illegal search-and-seizure. Finally, it analyzes 
the remaining issues regarding the aforementioned exclusionary rules.
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I. Introduction
The 1987 Constitution of Korea,1) which was a product of the 
nationwide June Struggle of 1987 that collapsed the iron fist regime and 
opened a new era of political democracy, explicitly stipulates the principle 
of due process in criminal procedures and provides very detailed Bill of 
Rights provisions regarding criminal procedural r ights. This 
“constitutionalization of criminal procedure” has brought significant 
changes in the theory and practice of the Korean criminal procedure. 
Exclusionary rules are in the middle of this “revolution”. The Korean 
Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional Court, which were newly 
established by the 1987 Constitution, have been active in order to control 
the illegal misconduct of law enforcement authorities which prevailed 
under the authoritarian regime, excluding illegally obtained statements, 
electronic communications and physical evidences. Following the 
landmark judicial decisions, the National Assembly also incorporated 
exclusion rules in legislation.
Firstly, this paper starts by reviewing the terrible situation under the 
authoritarian regime of Korea and the legal change after democratization. 
Secondly, focusing on the landmark judicial decisions and legislations 
including the Criminal Procedure Code2) [hereinafter “CPC”] and the 
Communication Privacy Protection Act [hereinafter “CPPA”],3) it examines 
three categories of exclusions: the exclusion of incriminating statements 
1) See daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art.12, 13 
& 27 & 28 (S. Kor.), available at http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/download/
Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf http://www.assembly.go.kr/english/laws/constitution/
constitution2.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
2) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012 (S. Kor.).
3) See Tongsinbimil boho beob [The Communication Privacy Protection Act], Act No. 
4650, Dec. 27, 1993, amended by Act. No. 12229, Jan. 14, 2014 (S. Kor.).
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obtained in the process of illegal arrest or interrogation, communications by 
illegal wiretapping and physical evidences obtained by illegal search-and-
seizure. Third, it analyzes the remaining issues regarding the aforementioned 
exclusionary rules. 
II. Almost No Exclusion under the Authoritarian Regime 
1. Brief History―Dark Age of Criminal Procedural Rights
During the period of the authoritarian regime starting from the rule of 
Rhee Syngman following liberation from the Japanese Occupation in 1945, 
democracy in South Korea was nominal. The following criticism of an 
American journalist in 1966 was valid during the whole period of the 
authoritarian regime: “Red roses don’t bloom beautifully in the garbage can 
like South Korea.” “Red roses don’t bloom beautifully in the “Red roses 
don’t bloom beautifully in the garbage can like South Korea.”garbage can 
like South Korea.”4) From the standpoint of human rights, the period of 
authoritarian regime was no more than a “Dark Age,” when the procedural 
rights of criminal suspects and defendants were nothing but meaningless 
rhetoric. Although the value of due process was written in textbook, it was 
overwhelmed by that of crime control in practice.
The Rhee Syngman government (1948-1960) did not purge pro-Japanese 
police officers who served the Japanese rule but guaranteed their position 
and even promoted them to maintain its authoritarian rule.5) As “loyal 
dogs” for the government,6) they used all kinds of illegal methods, which 
were applied to anti-Japanese liberation fighters, in order to suppress 
political dissidents as well as non-political criminal suspects. They also 
fabricated many cases. For instance, opposition congressmen, who were 
arrested for the suspicion of “pro-North fraction” by the military police in 
4) Carl T. Rowan. “Red roses don’t bloom beautifully in the garbage can like South 
Korea.” 14 December 1966.
5) Gabje Cho, speCialists of torture and fabriCation 11-12 (1987).
6) Id. at 11.
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1949, were severely tortured.7) Under the situation where even congressmen 
were illegally treated, it was inevitable that members of the general public 
were much easier victims of brutal police misconduct. 8) Kim Byoung Ro, 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, consistently criticized the authoritarian 
rule of the Rhee government in vain.9)
During the rule of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979), who was a leader of the 
1961 military coup, illegal police misconduct was systematically devised by 
the government. The Prosecutors’ Office and the Judiciary were considered 
as the “Offices of the Judge Advocate General,”10) and they gave up 
deterring police misconduct.
The Yushin regime, which bestowed Park a status of a de facto 
permanent President by the 1972 Constitution and suffocated the freedom 
of expression, was brazen in that it omitted the crucial Article to exclude 
involuntary confessions from the Constitution. Since the Yushin regime had 
proclaimed martial law, a great number of students, intellectuals, and 
opposing congressmen were arrested and tortured. 11) For instance, Lee Jae 
Oh, a congressman and former Minister of Special Affairs from 2010 to 
2011, who was a leader of the democratization movement at that time, was 
a victim of cruel torture.
One of the most high-profile cases under Park’s rule was that of the 
“People’s Revolution Party Rebuilding Committee” (inmin hyeokmyeong 
dang jaekeon wiwonhwei), (“PRP”).12) As the anti-Yushin movement was 
getting stronger in 1974, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(hereinafter KCIA) arrested and tortured alleged PRP members because 
they had allegedly pursued a communist revolution with connections to 
North Korea. Eight members were immediately executed just one day after 
their conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1975. For this 
7) GreGory henderson, Korea: the politiCs of the Vortex 167-68 (1968).
8) See Won soon parK, Vol.2, doCumentary of the barbariC days 273-298 (2006).
9) Rhee Syngman was expelled by the April Revolution of 1960, which was driven by the 
public mass who became furious for the fraudulent presidential election of 1960 followed by 
cruel suppression on opponent demonstrators.
10) in sup han, beyond the authoritarian Criminal laW 28 (2000).
11) Park, supra note 8, at 330-344.
12) See Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping With Past Wrongs After 
Democratization, 16 paC. rim l. & pol’y j. 3, 592-93 (2007).
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reason, this case has often been called “judicial murder.”13) Kim Ji Ha, who 
is a representative Korean poet, punished for his involvement with the 
PRP, said:
“The torture given to me was to deprive me of sleeping. … My 
eyes became uncontrollably hot. … When my eyes were open, a 
phantom of my father without eyes appeared. … They deprived me 
of sleeping for one week. In the condition that sleeping was allowed, 
I came to consent with their accusation that I was a ‘communist 
infiltrating the Catholics’.”14) 
In non-political criminal cases as well, procedural rights were 
meaningless. Leaving out a great number of torture cases against adults, let 
me briefly introduce some alarming cases of tortured minors: A seventeen-
year-old larceny suspect was beaten and forced to drink soapy water in 
1964, 15) a twelve-year old boy who was arrested for the suspicion of pick 
pocketing was beaten unconscious in 1969, 16) a sixteen-year-old larceny 
suspect was forced to drink water through his nose in 1970, 17) and a twelve-
year-old larceny suspect was beaten and forced to drink dirty water in 
1975. 18) 
The situation under the rule of Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1988), who was 
the leader of the 1980 military coup, was similar. Despite Article 11(6) of the 
1980 Constitution to exclude involuntary confessions, it had a limited effect 
on police officers. 
During the 1980s there were several highly profiled cases.19) Those who 
violated the National Security Law were brutally tortured and accused of 
13) CatholiC human riGhts Committee, judiCial murder: the massaCre of april 1975 164-
65 (2001). 
14) Moon Myung Huh, Kim Ji Ha and his Age, donG-a ilbo (July 23, 2013),  http://news.
donga.com/3/all/20130723/56603101/1.
15) See Park, supra note 8, at 399.
16) Id. at 416.
17) Id. at 421.
18) Id. at 427.
19) See  Kuk Cho, Unfinished “Criminal Procedure Revolution” of Post-Democratization South 
Korea, 30 denV. j. int’l l. & pol’y 3, 378-79 (2002). 
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being “pro-enemy leftists.” For instance, former Presidential Secretary Lee 
Tae Bok in 2002 and late Kim Geun Tae, former Minister of Health and 
Welfare from 2004 to 2005, who were then the leaders of the democratization 
movement,20) and Kim Moon Soo, former Governor of the Gyeonggi 
Province from 2006 to 2014, who was then a leader of the labor movement, 
were brutally tortured when arrested for a violation of the National 
Security Law in the first half of the 1980s. All of them were victims of all 
kinds of torture including torture by electricity or water. In the popularly 
called “Burim case,” college students in the city of Busan who organized a 
book club were arrested for a violation of the National Security Law in 
1980, and were severely tortured.21)  
In 1986, Professor Kwon In Sook, then a labor movement activist, was 
sexually abused by a policeman when arrested, and in 1987 Park Jong Chul, 
a Seoul National University student, was suffocated in a bathtub by police 
after being illegally arrested for information about a student activist 
movement. 
Besides political dissidents, ordinary people also had to go through the 
cruel investigation process. Let me introduce two of the most publicized 
cases. In 1981, Kim Si Hoon, a construction worker, was brutally tortured 
by the police and confessed to murder after being arrested. The real killer 
was arrested after Mr. Kim was given a fifteen-year imprisonment by the 
Kwangjoo High Court. After release, however, he became completely 
dejected. 22)  The Koh Sook Jong case of 1981 was also notorious. Confessing 
to murder, she was severely tortured by the police and made a false 
confession. Although she was found not guilty in a trial and given 
monetary compensation, the psychological and physical effects were 
immense. 23)   
20) The case of Kim Geun Tae was cinematized as “Namyoung-dong 1985” in 2012, 
attracting significant social attention. “Namyoung-dong” is the address of the Counter-
Communist Branch of the Police where Kim was tortured.
21) This case was filmed as a film titled “Byunhoin” in 2013, attracting more than ten 
million audiences. “Byunhoin” means attorney, indicating late President Roh Moo Hyun in 
particular who then played a crucial role as a defense attorney in the case.
22) See Park, supra note 8, at 224-29.
23) See Cho, supra note 5, at 241-269; Park, supra note 8, at 229-231.
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2. Almost No Judicial Control under the Meaningless Constitution
It is easily confirmed that during the period of the authoritarian regime, 
the Constitution was akin to the “Emperor’s new clothes.” The 
Constitutions under the authoritarian regime stipulated several provisions 
regarding procedural rights such as the right not to be tortured and the 
privilege against self-incrimination,24) the right to counsel, 25) and the rule to 
exclude involuntary confessions.26) The exclusion of confessions when 
“confessions whose voluntariness is doubtful for they are made under 
torture, battery, threat, deceit, after prolonged custody or by any other 
method”, which was first introduced in 1954,27)  was maintained under the 
authoritarian rule except in the 1972 Constitution. However, these 
provisions were titular. 
Illegal police practices including torture, illegal arrest and detention to 
obtain confession, were widespread in the criminal process. Beating, 
threatening, and torture by water or electricity were routinely applied to 
not only political dissidents but also ordinary criminal suspects. Hwang Ji 
24) 1962 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 10 
¶ 2 (Dec. 26, 1962) (S. Kor.); 1969 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the 
republiC of Korea] art. 10 ¶ 2 (Oct. 21, 1969) (S. Kor.); 1972 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] 
[Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 10 ¶ 2 (Dec. 27, 1972) (S. Kor.); 1980 daehanminKuK 
hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 11 ¶ 2 (Oct. 27, 1980) (S. Kor.).
25) 1948 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 9 
(July 17, 1948) (S. Kor.); 1952 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC 
of Korea] art. 9 (July 7, 1952) (S. Kor.); 1954 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution 
of the republiC of Korea] art. 9 (Nov. 29, 1954) (S. Kor.); 1960 daehanminKuK hunbeob 
[hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 9 (June 15, 1960(S. Kor.); 1962 
daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 10 ¶ 4 (Dec. 26, 
1962) (S. Kor.); 1969 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] 
art. 10 ¶ 4 (Oct. 21, 1969) (S. Kor.); 1972 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of 
the republiC of Korea] art. 10 ¶ 4 (Dec. 27, 1972) (S. Kor.); 1980 daehanminKuK hunbeob 
[hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 11 ¶ 4 (Oct. 27, 1980) (S. Kor.).
26) 1962 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 10 
¶ 6 (Dec. 26, 1962) (S. Kor.); 1969 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the 
republiC of Korea] art. 10 ¶ 6 (Oct. 21, 1969) (S. Kor.); 1980 daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] 
[Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 11 ¶ 6 (Oct. 27, 1980) (S. Kor.).
27) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 309 (S. Kor.)
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Woo, who is a representative Korean poet and who was punished for his 
anti-government activities by the Chun government, described his 
experience of torture as “surgical operation without anesthesia.” 28) He 
stated that:
“Extreme torture is the existence of never-ending pains, making 
death a hope. The professional mind of the torture technicians is to 
give pain but not death as eternal rest. … As rest lies outside a 
medical record document, truth generally lies outside interrogation 
dossiers.” 29)
The Latin phrase, “Confession est regina probationum”, which means 
“Confession is the Queen of evidence”, prevailed in the criminal process. 
Law enforcement authorities obtained confession from suspects by any 
means and at any cost, eviscerating the confession rule. 
Prosecutors gave up controlling police misconduct and even abetted the 
police. The judiciary did not take defendants’ claims of being abused by the 
police seriously. Critical appeals from both academics and defense 
attorneys did not receive any substantial reaction in the criminal justice 
system. Although there were a few Supreme Court cases that excluded 
illegally obtained confessions,30) the Court did not listen carefully to the 
victims’ outcries in most cases. It held:
“The argument [of the defense attorney] is that the statements in 
the prosecutor-made interrogation dossiers are involuntary for they 
are made after prolonged custody, under torture, inducement, and 
coercion. Reviewing the records, however, there is no data that the 
statements are involuntary and unreliable.” 31)
Heavily relying on the records in the interrogation dossiers, the Court 
28) Ji Woo Hwang, Naeui Jakpoom Naeui Yeki, donG-a ilbo (Oct. 11, 1990)
29) Id. (emphasis added). 
30) See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 81Do2160, Oct. 13, 1981 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. 
Ct.], 84Do36, Mar. 13, 1984 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Do1843, Sept. 28, 1993 (S. Kor.).
31) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 80Do2579, Dec. 23, 1980 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added). 
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easily discarded defendants’ allegations of police abuse. As a result, the 
evidentiary power of the prosecutor-made interrogation dossiers become 
almost invincible. 
The Court also turned its face away from the reality of police 
misconducts. 
“It is especially rare that there exist such situations that make 
statements involuntary…the voluntariness of statements are 
presumed.”32)
This decision actually freed prosecutors of the burden of proof and 
pulled down the principle of in dubio pro reo as well as the confession rule.
Besides, under the authoritarian regime, the Supreme Court consistently 
declined to exclude physical evidence obtained by illegal search-and-
seizure procedures, providing the following rationale:
“Even though the procedure of seizure was illegal, the value as 
evidence does not change because the procedure did not affect the 
quality and shape of the substance itself.”33) 
As a result, search-and-seizure proceeded with almost no restriction and 
the constitutional principle of warrant became meaningless. 
III.  Vitalization and Codification of Exclusionary Rules 
after Democratization
1.  “Constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure” after the 1987 
Constitution34)
The 1987 Constitution established a blueprint for the “constitutionalization 
32) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 82Do3248, Mar. 3, 1983 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added). 
33) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 68Do932, Sept. 17, 1968 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
87Do705, June 23, 1987 (S. Kor.).
34) See This part is an update of Cho, supra note 19, at 379-380.
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of criminal procedure” in Korea. It has required that criminal procedure be 
under the control of the Constitution and has provided a detailed Bill of 
Rights to guarantee the procedural rights of criminal suspects and 
defendants. 
First, Article 12 (1) and (3) of the Constitution have explicitly 
incorporated the principle of due process in criminal procedures. This is 
influenced by  Amendments 5 and 14 of the United States Constitution. 35) 
According to the Constitutional Court, the principle is “to guarantee not 
only the legality of the procedure but also the legitimateness of the 
procedure.”36) The Court made sure that the principle of due process was a 
core value to penetrate and control all stages of criminal procedure, stating:
The principle of due process requires that both the formal 
procedure described by the law and the substantial content of the 
law be reasonable and just…. In particular, it declares that the whole 
criminal procedure should be controlled from the standpoint of 
guaranteeing the constitutional basic rights.37)
Second, the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitution provides very 
detailed provisions regarding criminal procedural rights, including strict 
requirements for obtaining judicial warrants for compulsory measures,38) 
the right not to be tortured,39) privilege against self-incrimination,40) right to 
counsel,41) right to be informed of the reason of arrest or detention,42) right to 
request judicial hearing for arrest or detention,43) exclusionary rule of 
35) donG Woon shin, Criminal proCedure laW 7 (5th ed. 2014).
36) See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 92Hun-Ka8, Dec. 24, 1992, (4 KCCR, 853) (S. 
Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 90Hun-Ba35, July 29, 1993, (5-2 KCCR, 14-35) (S. 
Kor.).
37) Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 94Hun-Ba1, Dec. 26, 1996, (8-2 KCCR, 808) (S. Kor.).
38) daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 12 ¶ 3 & 
16 (S. Kor.).
39) Id. art. 12 ¶ 2.
40) Id.
41) Id. art. 12 ¶ 4.
42) Id. art. 12 ¶ 5.
43) Id. art. 12 ¶ 6.
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illegally obtained confession,44) protection against double jeopardy,45) right 
to a fair trial,46) right to a speedy and open trial,47) presumption of 
innocence,48) and right to compensation for when the suspect and defendant 
is found to be innocent.49) 
These rights incorporated in the Constitution reflect the Korean people’s 
desire to guarantee their human rights, which had been nominal under 
authoritarian regime. Mass media, the human rights movement, and 
academics strongly emphasized the importance of procedural rights.
Since then, the Korean criminal justice system has been reconstructed. 
During the reconstruction process, the courts have played a crucial role. 
Since the 1990s, the Korean Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional 
Court have made a series of legislative decisions excluding illegally obtained 
statements of criminal suspects and defendants during interrogation even 
when an explicit legal provision was not available. The Legislature has also 
contributed to the reconstruction. In 1993 the CPPA was legislated to 
exclude communications obtained by illegal wiretapping. In 1995 the 
National Assembly ratified the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In 2007, the CPC 
was revised to stipulate a general provision of the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence.
In brief, since the 1987 Constitution requested that criminal procedure 
law play as a “concretely applied Constitution,” 50) Korean criminal 
procedure law has gradually transformed from a “legalist criminal 
procedure law” to a “constitutional criminal procedure law. ”51) 
44) Id. art. 12 ¶ 7.
45) Id. art. 13 ¶ 1.
46) Id. art. 27 ¶ 1.
47) Id. art. 27 ¶ 3.
48) Id. art. 27 ¶ 4.
49) Id. art. 28.
50) Jong Dae Bae et al., new Criminal ProCeDure law 5 (2nd ed. 2009).
51) Shin, supra note 35, at 5.
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2. Adoption of Miranda and Massiah
1) Judicial Activism to Bolster Rights to Silence and Counsel since the 1990s52)
In a series of landmark decisions in the 1990s, the Korean Supreme 
Court has strengthened the rights to silence and counsel. The first step was 
its 1992 decision in the popularly called “New 21st Century Faction” case, 
named after the title of the criminal organization the defendant belonged 
to. In the decision, the prosecutor did not inform the defendant of the right 
to silence before videotaping the interrogation. 53)  The Court excluded the 
defendant’s confession by stating:
“The right to silence is based on the privilege against self-
incrimination. … The statements elicited without informing of the 
right to silence in interrogation are illegally obtained evidence, and 
so should be excluded, even if they are disclosed voluntarily.” 54) 
In 2001, the Court also held that the statements of suspects caught in the 
act should be excluded without informing them of their right to silence.55)
In these decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to 
silence is the most crucial legal instrument to protect a suspect, particularly 
when the suspect is under interrogation without his/her counsel. The 
Court evidently rejected the traditional “voluntary test” to exclude 
confessions. It is certain that the Court adopted the rationale of the U.S. 
Miranda rule56) to exclude the statement and recognized Article 9(2) of the 
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.57) Notably, 
52) This part is an update of Kuk Cho, The Reformed Criminal Procedure of Post-
democratization South Korea, in litiGation in Korea 58, 69-71 & 80-82 (Kuk Cho eds., 2010); Cho, 
supra note 19, at 383-84.
53) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 92Do682, June 23, 1992 (S. Kor.). This case is popularly 
called the “New 21st Century Faction” case, named after the title of the criminal organization 
the defendant belonged to.
54) Id. (emphasis added).
55) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Do229, Mar. 9, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
56) See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57) The Article provides that “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of 
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neither the Constitution nor the CPC had an explicit provision about the 
exclusion at that time, although both the Constitution and CPC stipulates 
the right to be informed of the reason for arrest or detention.58) 
Second, in two National Security Act violation cases in the 1990s,59) the 
Supreme Court also made landmark decisions, which may be called the 
Korean version of the U.S. Massiah rule. 60) For instance, in the decision of 
September 25, 1990, the defendants requested to meet with their attorney 
when they were detained, but the National Security Agency officers 
rejected their request. Then, the defendants were referred to and 
interrogated by the prosecutor. The Court held that the defendants’ self-
incriminating statements were illegally obtained for violating their right to 
counsel, and, thus, were excluded, holding as follows:
“Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides people with the right 
to assistance from counsel when arrested or detained, accordingly, 
Articles 30 and 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribe the 
right of suspects or defendants to appoint counsel and communicate 
with counsel when they are in custody. The right to counsel like this 
constitutes the nucleus of the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
assistance from counsel. . . . The limitation of the right to meet and 
communicate with counsel violates the constitutionally guaranteed 
basic right, so the illegally obtained confession of the suspect should 
be excluded, and the exclusion means a substantial and complete 
exclusion.”61)
arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against 
him.” See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9 ¶ 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. ICCPR was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, and entered into force at 23 
March 1976, in accordance with Article 4.
58) daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 12 ¶ 5 
(S. Kor.); Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 200 ¶ 2 (S. Kor.).
59) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 90Do1285, Aug. 24, 1990 (S. Kor.). This case is popularly 
called the “Legislator Seo Kyung Won Case”; Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 90Do1586, Sept. 25, 1990 
(S. Kor.). This case is popularly called the “Artist Hong Seong Dam Case”. 
60) See Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
61) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 90Do1586, Sept. 25, 1990 (S. Kor.); Hyongsa sosong beob 
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Both the Constitution and CPC provide the right to counsel.62) In these 
two cases, the Court provided Article 309 of CPC as grounds to exclude the 
defendant’s confession. The Article provides for the exclusion when 
“confessions whose voluntariness is doubtful for they are made under 
torture, battery, threat, deceit, after prolonged custody or by any other 
method.” 63) It is assumed that the Court considered the violation of the right 
to counsel as falling under “any other method.”
The Constitutional Court has also repeatedly confirmed that the right to 
counsel in criminal process is an “absolute right” of the defendant, so it 
cannot be limited “by any reason including national security, public order 
or public welfare.”64) A leading case as an example of this was the decision 
of January 28, 1992, where the Court reviewed the appeal of a National 
Security Act violation defendant. While he had a meeting with his counsel, 
the National Security Agency officers took a picture of the meeting and 
took a record of the meeting. The Court held that these acts were 
unconstitutional,65) stating:
“Counsels should figure out the situation of detained suspects or 
defendants and seek for proper countermeasures, explain the 
meaning of the suspected and accused facts to them, hear their 
opinions, and discuss measures, provide counsel’s opinion about the 
method, degree, time, content of statements of the suspects or 
defendants and give guidance to them, teach the importance of the 
right to silence or the right not to make a signature and how to 
exercise it, make the suspects or defendants recognize that they may 
[Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 
2012, art. 30, 34 (S. Kor.).
62) daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 12 ¶ 4 
(S. Kor.).
63) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 309 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added).
64) See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 91Hun-Ma111, Jan. 28, 1992, (4 KCCR, 51) (S. 
Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 92Hun-Ma144, July 21, 1995, (7-2 KCCR, 94) (S. Kor.); 
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2000Hun-Ma138, Sept. 23, 2004, (16-2(A) KCCR, 543) (S. 
Kor.) (emphasis added).
65) Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 91Hun-Ma111, Jan. 28, 1992, (4 KCCR, 51) (S. Kor.).
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be free of falsified crimes by exercising the right, inform them of the 
possibility of coercion, deceit, inducement, torture by the law 
enforcement authorities and teach them how to deal with them, 
recommend them not to make false confessions, frequently check 
improper investigation such as inducement, threat, benefit, or 
violence, and encourage, bestow courage to, console, advise the 
suspects or defendants when finding their anxiety, despair, worry, 
or bluff.”
Here it may be confirmed that the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court accepted Article 14(3) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.66) 
Third, in the decision of November 11, 2003, in a National Security Act 
violation case of Professor Song Doo Yul, an allegedly pro-North Korean-
German dissident who was arrested and detained when he visited Seoul, 
the Supreme Court made another ground-breaking decision to recognize 
the right to have counsel during interrogation as a constitutional right of 
suspects.67) 
Neither the Constitution nor the CPC had an explicit provision for the 
right to have a lawyer present during interrogation at that time, although 
both provide the right to counsel in general.68) Over this lack of a positive 
provision, law enforcement authorities did not allow defense counsel, 
retained by suspects, to attend interrogation sessions. However, the 
Supreme Court held:
“Although the CPC has not provided a positive provision for the 
right to request the participation of a counsel during interrogation, 
66) The Article provides that “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to … be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or 
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not 
have sufficient means to pay for it.” See ICCPR art. 14 ¶ 3, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
67) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Mo402, Nov. 11, 2003 (S. Kor.).
68) daehanminKuK hunbeob [hunbeob] [Constitution of the republiC of Korea] art. 12 ¶ 4 
(S. Kor.).
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… it should be interpreted that the right may be recognized by 
analogical interpretation of Article 34 of the CPC which allows for the 
right to meet and communicate with counsel, and law enforcement 
authorities may not reject the request.”69) 
The Supreme Court also provided narrow exceptions not to permit 
counsel’s participation in interrogation, that is, the participation may be 
restricted when it is “objectively clear when there is reason for probable 
cause” that the counsel would “obstruct interrogation” or “leak the secret 
of investigation.”70) It also stated;
“There are no provisions to restrict detained persons’ meeting 
and communication with their counsel in current laws. Therefore, 
detained persons should be guaranteed and allowed to meet and 
communicate with their counsel anytime during the interrogation by 
law enforcement authorities.”71) 
Here the Constitutional Court showed its legal philosophy based on 
Article 5 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, 
providing that “Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law.” 
Reviewing the infringement of a non-detained suspect because of its 
singular right to counsel in a Public Office Election Act violation case,72) the 
6-to-3 opinion of the Constitutional Court on September 23, 2004 confirmed 
that the right to have counsel present during interrogation is a 
constitutional right of the suspect and approved the exceptions to the right 
provided by the Supreme Court in Professor Song Doo Yul’s case. The 
Court also made it clear that a procedural right stipulated in the 
Constitution has a binding effect without a specific provision in a lower 
law.73) 
69) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Mo402, Nov. 11, 2003 (S. Kor.)
70) Id. (emphasis added).
71) Id. 
72) See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2000Hun-Ma138, Sept. 23, 2004, (16-2(A) KCCR, 
543) (S. Kor.).
73) Id. 
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Miranda and Massiah are often considered to be politically liberal rules 
both in and out of Korea. Although they are being adopted by judges in 
Korea before the Legislature takes an initiative, the majority of Korean 
judges may not be regarded as politically liberal. They are rather 
conservative. Having experienced the long-time authoritarian rule, 
however, they have come to assume themselves to be controllers of the 
misconduct of law enforcement authorities and an initiator and guardian of 
due process values. This would be one of the reasons for the judicial 
activism that junior judges who spent their youth under authoritarian rule 
began to raise their voice in the judiciary. It is assumed that in all of the 
aforementioned decisions the Supreme Court did not have a big burden to 
exclude the defendants’ statements, for they could be convicted upon 
untainted evidence.
2) Reallocation of the Burden to Prove the Voluntariness of Confessions
In 1998, the Supreme Court changed its previous opinion (1983) that the 
voluntariness of statements is presumed. 74) The Court held:
“The reason why it is necessary to exclude involuntary 
confessions is not only because confessions obtained in situations 
where false statements are induced or forced do not accord to 
substantive truth and cause misjudgment, but also because 
irrespective of the truthfulness of the confessions, illegal or improper 
pressure violating basic human rights of the suspects to obtain 
confession should be deterred in advance. Therefore, when the 
voluntariness of the confession is in dispute, … prosecutors should 
get rid of the doubts regarding the voluntariness. ”75)
In 2008, the Supreme Court reconfirmed this opinion, stating;
“When the voluntariness of the suspect’s confession recorded in 
prosecutors’ dossiers is in dispute, … prosecutors should get rid of 
the doubts regarding the voluntariness. If prosecutors cannot, the 
74) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 82Do3248, Mar. 3, 1983 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added).
75) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 97Do3234, Apr. 10, 1998 (S. Kor.).
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dossier should not be used as evidence to prove guilt. This rule also 
applies to situations where the suspect or his/her counsel reverses 
positions after admitting voluntariness.”76)
The Court made it clear that the voluntary statements are not presumed 
and prosecutors bear the burden to prove that confessions weren’t forced. It 
is expected that this change will cause more exclusion of involuntary 
confessions. 
3) The 2007 Revision of the Criminal Procedure Code and Following Issues
The 2007 revision of the CPC codifies all the aforementioned decisions. 
Before the revision, the right to counsel for arrested or detained suspects 
and defendants was already stipulated in the CPC. 77) The 2007 revision 
newly provides the right to have a counsel participate in interrogation.78) 
Article 243-2(3) of the CPC provides: 
“Counsels participating in interrogation may express their 
opinion after interrogation by law enforcement authorities ends. 
Even during interrogation, however, they may present objections to 
improper interrogation methods and present opinions with approval 
of prosecutors or police officers.” 79)
It is certain that counsel’s presence prevents illegal interrogation. 
However, this is not enough. Except when improper interrogation occurs or 
with interrogators’ approval, counsels may not interfere with the 
interrogation but simply sit with suspects. In most cases, as a result, when 
law enforcement authorities are interrogating, counsels may not give 
advice to suspects about whether or not to answer or what to say. They 
may give advice to suspects before interrogation begins or check the 
interrogation dossiers after interrogation ends. Suspects may not seek 
76) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do1200, July 10, 2008 (S. Kor.). 
77) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 89, 209 & 213-2 (S. Kor.).
78) Id. art. 243-2 ¶ 1.
79) Id. art. 242-2 ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
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counsels’ advice when interrogators cast questions that suspects and 
counsels did not expect, and so did not prepare for. In this context, the right 
to counsel is still limited. 
Article 242-2(3) of the CPC provides that the right to have a counsel 
participate in interrogation may be restricted when there is “justifiable 
cause.”80) “Justifiable cause” will be interpreted following the exceptions 
previously provided by the Supreme Court in the Professor Song Doo Yul 
case, 81) which means probable cause that the counsel would “obstruct 
interrogation” or “leak the secret of the investigation.”82) 
However, the Working Rules for Prosecutors’ Cases,83) which is made by 
the Ministry of Justice, extends exceptions to the right to have counsel 
participate in interrogation. 
First, Article 9-2(3) of the Working Rules provides that even when the 
right has been exercised, interrogation may begin if counsel does not 
appear or cannot appear “in appropriate time.”84) There remains the 
problem of how to define “appropriate time” and there is a possibility that 
law enforcement authorities could weaken the newly introduced right by 
use of Article 9-2(3). 
Second, Article 9-2(4) of the Working Rules provides the following 
situations as examples of “obstructing interrogation” or “leaking the secret 
of the investigation”: (i) a counsel improperly intervenes or makes insulting 
language or behaviors, (ii) a counsel makes an answer instead of a suspect 
or induces a suspect to make a specific answer or reverse his/her previous 
answer, (iii) a counsel makes an objection improperly against Article 243-2, 
(iv) a counsel films, records or writes down the interrogation. Concerning 
the prohibition of (iv), the Rules allows a counsel to make “brief writings 
for refreshing their memory” in order to provide legal advice for the 
suspect.85)
80) Id. art. 243-2 ¶ 1.
81) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 82Do3248, Mar. 3, 1983 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added).
82) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Mo402, Nov. 11, 2003 (S. Kor.).
83) See Keomchalsageonsamu kyuchik [The Working Rules for Prosecutors’ Cases], 
Ministry Decree, No. 766, Mar. 15, 2012.
84) Id. art. 9-2 ¶ 3.
85) Id. art. 9-2 ¶ 4.
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Like Article 9-2(3), Article 9-2(4) also includes uncertain and vague 
terms such as “improper intervention”, “improper objection” and 
“insulting language or behaviors.” It intends to weaken the right to have 
counsel participate in interrogation by the prohibitions of (ii) and (iii) in 
particular.86)
Articles 9-2(3) and 9-2(4) of the Working Rules have not been challenged 
in either the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court. However, in the 
decision of September 12, 2008,87) the Supreme Court showed its 
determination to help the newly introduced right to be firmly established in 
the criminal process. In this case, a police officer ordered a counsel to get 
out of the interrogation room, refusing the request of the counsel who 
insisted on sitting with a suspect. The Supreme Court held that the officer 
violated the right of counsel to participate in interrogation. 
On the other hand, the 2007 revision provided the full version of 
Miranda rule.88) According to Article 244-3(1) of the CPC, prior to 
interrogation, investigative authorities should inform a suspect that (i) a 
suspect can choose not to make any statements or refuse to respond to 
specific questions; (ii) no disadvantage shall be given to a suspect even if he 
or she chooses not to make a statement; (iii) anything a suspect says after 
waiving the right to silence may be used as incriminatory evidence against 
the suspect in court; (iv) a suspect has a right to counsel including a “right 
to have counsel participate in interrogation.” The suspect’s answer should 
be recorded either by his/her handwriting on the document or with his/
her written approval of the document made by the investigative 
authorities. 89) 
After the 2007 revision of the CPC was made, the Ministry of Justice 
argued in its commentary of the revision that the requirements of the 
Miranda warnings do not apply when a suspect is “investigated”(調査) but 
when a suspect is “interrogated”(訊問). 90) This interpretation presented 
86) Bae et al., supra note 50, at 109; Shin, supra note 35, at 257.
87) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do794, Sept. 12, 2008 (S. Kor.).
88) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 244-3 ¶ 1 (S. Kor.).
89) Id. art. 244-3 ¶ 2.
90) ministry of justiCe, reVised Criminal proCedure Code 126 (2007).
 The Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Confessions, Electronic Communications ~   |  195No. 2: 2014
Article 200 of the CPC as its rationale, which provides, “Prosecutors or 
police officers may request suspects to appear and hear their statements 
when necessary for investigation.”91) According to the Ministry of Justice, 
“hearing statements” according to Article 200 is free from the requirements 
of Article 244-3(1).
Professor Shin Dong Woon criticizes this interpretation:
“This opinion overlooks the 2007 revision of the CPC stipulated 
in Article 244-3(1) to substantially strengthen the right to silence. … 
Although there exists some linguistic difference between ‘hearing 
statements’ and ‘interrogation,’ it cannot work as grounds to weaken 
the suspect’s right to defense. There is no difference between 
‘hearing statements’ and ‘interrogation’ in that the law enforcement 
authorities obtain statements from suspects.”92)
In the decision of November 10, 2011,93) the Supreme Court held that the 
Miranda warnings in Article 244-3(1) apply when the status of a suspect is 
recognized and “the status of a suspect is recognized when the law 
enforcement authorities begin to recognize the criminal suspicion of the 
object of the investigation and initiate investigation.” This means that the 
Miranda warnings should be given to a person who has been given the 
status of a suspect in either ‘hearing statements’ or ‘interrogation.’
3.  The Exclusion in the Communication Privacy Protection Act of 1993 
and its Limitation
In the first year of the Kim Young Sam government known as the 
“Civilian Government”, the CPPA was legislated. Under the authoritarian 
regime, there was not a law to regulate wiretapping by the law enforcement 
authorities, so wiretapping was freely used without any restriction. 
President Kim Young Sam, who once was a political leader of the 
91) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 200 (S. Kor.).
92) Shin, supra note 35, at 248.
93) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2011Do8125, Nov. 10, 2011 (S. Kor.). 
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democratization movement and was put under illegal surveillance under 
the authoritarian regime, was now active to make the CPPA.94)  
Article 3 of the CPPA provides that, “Without a grounds from the 
CPPA, CPC and the Military Court Act, anyone may not inspect letters, 
wiretap electronic communications, or record or eavesdrop on 
conversations between others” and  Article 14(1) provides that, “Anyone 
may neither record undisclosed conversations between others nor 
eavesdrop on them by using electronic devices or mechanical means.” In 
particular, Article 4 of the CPPA provides that, “the content of the letter 
obtained by illegal inspection and that of the electronic communications 
obtained by illegal wiretapping shall not be used in a trial or a sanction 
discipline process.”95) It is noteworthy that the exclusionary rule of Article 4 
is very strong in that the evidence obtained by violating the CPPA shall not 
be used not only in a criminal trial but also in a civil trial or administrative 
sanction process.
In two National Security Law cases in 1999, the Supreme Court 
excluded the defendant’s communication obtained by illegal wiretapping. 
The Court held that the telephone communications of the defendant whose 
name was not in the permission warrant issued by the court should not be 
used in a trial even though his telephone number was in the warrant,96) and 
that the recording of communications should not be used in a trial because 
the warrant only permitted wiretapping of electronic communications and 
inspection of letters.97) In another National Security Law case in 2002,98) the 
Court held that the telephone communications obtained by the permission 
94) The background of this Act is an ironic political incident, which is popularly called  a 
“Puffer Restaurant Case”. Just before the presidential election, high-ranking public officials 
had a secret meeting for the illegal intervention of the election in a puffer restaurant in Pusan. 
They worked for the ruling Democratic Liberal Party’s candidate, Kim Young Sam. The 
members of the Unification National Party led by Chung Joo Young, former CEO of the 
Hyundai Group, wiretapped the conversation in the restaurant to publicize it. Although Kim 
Young Sam was at a disadvantage for this incident, he reversed the situation by arguing he 
was a victim of illegal wiretapping.
95) See Tongsinbimil boho beob [The Communication Privacy Protection Act], Act No. 
4650, Dec. 27, 1993, amended by Act. No. 12229, Jan. 14, 2014, art. 4 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added).
96) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Do2318, Sept. 3, 1999 (S. Kor.).
97) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Do2317, Sept. 3, 1999 (S. Kor.).
98) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Do5461, Oct. 22, 2002 (S. Kor.). 
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warrant may be used to investigate and prosecute only the crimes that the 
warrant indicates.
Despite these positive changes, judges tend to issue warrants without 
strict scrutiny. According to the data submitted by the Daegu District Court 
to the National Congress in 2004, the judges of the Court approved all the 
requests for the “measure of communication restriction” in 2002.99) Besides, 
the CPPA itself has two major exceptions for the warrant requirement for 
“measure of communication restriction”: “exigent measure of communication 
restriction”100) and “measure of communication restriction for national 
security.”101)  
The “exigent measure of communication restriction” is allowed to check 
“conspiracy to threaten national security, the plan or the execution of 
serious crimes such as the crimes that are likely to cause death or severe 
bodily injury or organized crimes.”102)  It allows the law enforcement 
authority thirty-six hours free from judicial review.103)  As a result, if the law 
enforcement authorities repeat the “exigent measure” for the period of less 
than thirty-six hours, the measure may be extended to be limitless with 
judicial control.
The “measure of communication restriction for national security” is 
allowed for any crimes when the chief of national intelligent agencies 
expects “substantial danger to the guarantee of national security” and 
requests the measure.104)  It is permitted by the President of Korea, free of 
the review of either the Judiciary or of the Legislature.
99) Maeil Shinmun, Oct. 5, 2004
100) See Tongsinbimil boho beob [The Communication Privacy Protection Act], Act No. 
4650, Dec. 27, 1993, amended by Act. No. 12229, Jan. 14, 2014, art. 8 (S. Kor.).
101) Id. art. 7.
102) Id. art. 8 ¶ 1.
103) Id. art. 8 ¶ 2.
104) Id. art. 7 ¶ 1.
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4. Adoption of Mapp
1)  Judicial and Legislative Adoption of Discretionary Exclusionary rule in 
Search-and-Seizure in 2007105)
Although the Supreme Court adopted Miranda and Massiah, the 
Supreme Court had consistently declined to exclude physical evidence 
obtained by illegal search-and-seizure procedures since 1968 until 
recently.106) The Court clearly rejected the U.S. Fourth Amendment Mapp 
exclusionary rule.107)
Academics and defense attorneys argued that unless illegally obtained 
evidence is excluded, the constitutional requirement for the search-and-
seizure warrant is left without any teeth. There are no other effective 
remedies for illegal police misconduct in Korea. Criminal or civil liability 
and internal discipline have not proven effective in deterring police 
misconduct in Korea.
Just before the 2007 revision of the CPC, which stipulated Article 308-2 
of the CPC providing that “evidence obtained not through due process 
shall not be admissible,”108) in November 15, 2007 the Supreme Court made 
an epoch-making decision to exclude illegally obtained physical 
evidence.109)  
In this case, Governor Kim Tae Hwan of Jeju Province was investigated 
for a violation of the Public Office Election Act. Law enforcement officers 
entered Kim Tae-Hwan’s office to obtain evidence with a warrant, which 
limited the scope of search-and-seizure to the “items stored in the room” 
used by Kim Dae Hee, a special policy aide of Kim Tae Hwan. Law 
enforcement officers ran into Han Seok Dae, a secretary of Kim Tae Hwan, 
who carried confidential documents to the room, and seized the 
documents. The documents included criminal proof. 
105) This part is an update of Cho, supra note 52, at 80-82.
106) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 68Do932, Sept. 17, 1968 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
87Du705, June 23, 1987 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Do3318, Feb. 8, 1994 (S. Kor.).
107)  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
108) See Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 308-2 (S. Kor.). 
109) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Do3061, Nov. 15, 2007 (S. Kor.).
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Following the Supreme Court’s precedents, lower courts rejected the 
defense counsel’s argument that the documents should be excluded. 
However, the Supreme Court overthrew the lower court’s decision, stating:
“The most effective and certain countermeasure to deter and 
control the search-and-seizure by law enforcement authorities, that 
does not abide by procedural provisions is to prohibit not only 
illegally obtained evidence but also its derivative evidence from 
being used for conviction.” 110)
It is certain that the Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the U.S. 
Mapp rule. However, the Court did not adopt a mandatory exclusionary 
rule but a discretionary one. The majority opinion held that the illegally 
obtained evidence should not be “uniformly” excluded but could be 
excluded considering “all the circumstances regarding the procedural 
breaches in the evidence collecting process by the investigative authorities.” 
111) 
Then, the majority opinion provided a standard for inclusion: “whether 
the procedural breaches by the investigative authorities violate substantial 
contents of due process.”112) Criticizing that this standard is too vague and 
strict, the concurring opinion provided a different standard: “whether the 
evidence collecting process ignores the spirit and meaning of the warrant 
principle, so the illegality of the process is so significant that the evidence 
should be excluded.”113) Literal phrases of both the majority opinion and the 
concurring opinion are abstract. The real difference is that the majority 
opinion emphasizes the principle of exclusion, while the concurring 
opinion criticizes the strictness of the majority opinion. 
It is also noteworthy that unlike the concurring opinion, the majority 
opinion explicitly states that secondary evidence derived from first 




113) Id. Concurring opinion by Justices Yang Seung Tae, Kim Neung Hwan & Ahn Dae 
Hee.
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circumstances regarding the collecting process of the derivative evidence 
including dilution or severance of the causation between the first illegal 
evidence and the derivative evidence.” 114) Here the majority opinion adopts 
the U.S. principle of “the fruit of the poisonous tree.”115)
The political background of this turning of the Supreme Court after a 
long time rejecting the Mapp rule since 1968 was that the 2004 Presidential 
Committee on Judicial Reform [sabeopchedo kaehyeok chujin wiweonhoe] 
submitted a bill for the revision of the CPC including the exclusionary rule 
after a period of heated discussions and debates, and the National 
Assembly was expected to pass the bill soon. The Supreme Court made the 
decision on November 15, 2007 and the National Assembly passed the bill 
on December 21, 2007. It is assumed that the Court did not want to lose the 
initiative for adopting the rule and it also intended to prepare a standard 
for the exclusion.
2) Relevant Rulings
The Supreme Court decision of March 12, 2009, which was a follow-up 
decision of the landmark decision of November 15, 2007, is also 
important.116)  The Court rejected the appeal of the prosecutors in the case of 
Governor Kim Tae Hwan, providing some important rules. First, the Court 
held that phrases in a warrant should be not be interpreted analogically in a 
manner disadvantageous to the targeted persons, but should be strictly 
interpreted from the viewpoint of the Constitution and the CPC, and thus 
“items stored in the targeted place” should not be interpreted as “items 
present in the targeted place.” This ruling was to exclude the confidential 
documents carried by Han Seok Dae.
Second, the Court held that in principle a warrant should be presented 
to all the persons respectively whose names are on the warrant; so a 
warrant should also be presented to the person who carries the targeted 
items, even if it is presented to a supervisor in charge of the targeted place.
Third, the Court provided a very significant ruling regarding the 
burden of proof:
114) Id.
115) Silverthrone Lumber v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Nardone v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
116) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do763, Mar. 12, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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“For the court to recognize that despite the procedural violation 
made by law enforcement authorities the illegally obtained evidence 
may be exceptionally used to prove the guilt of the defendant, the 
prosecutor should prove that there exists concrete and special 
circumstances for such exceptions to apply.” 117)
This ruling is a follow-up decision to the 1998 and 2008 decisions that 
the voluntariness of statements is not presumed and prosecutors bear the 
burden of proof.118) 
In 2013 the Supreme Court made two decisions not to exclude 
secondary evidence derived from first evidence obtained illegally. In a 
March 14 decision, 119) the Court held that the secondary result of a urine 
test with a court warrant is admissible although the first result of the urine 
test obtained by illegal arrest without a warrant is not admissible. In a 
March 28 decision, the Court also held that the defendant’s confession, duly 
obtained in a court, is admissible although police illegally obtained the 
personal information of the defendant without a warrant and the contents 
of the first confession obtained in the illegal detention. 120)
After the adoption of Mapp, there remained a question of whether or not 
the illegally obtained evidence may be used with defendants or their 
counsel. In 2009 and 2010 the Supreme Court made it clear that the 
evidence should be excluded even if the defendants or their counsel had 
given consent to its inclusion.121)  The Court prevented law enforcement 
authorities from avoiding the exclusionary rule by getting consent.
5. New Structure of the Exclusionary Rules
Now the Korean criminal justice system has three codified exclusionary 
rules: Article 309 of the CPC to exclude incriminating statements obtained 
117) Id.
118) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 82Do3248, Mar. 3, 1983 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
97Du3234, Apr. 10, 1998 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do1200, July 10, 2008 (S. Kor.).
119) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do13611, Mar. 14, 2013 (S. Kor.).
120) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do13607, Mar. 28, 2013 (S. Kor.).
121) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Do11401, Dec. 24, 2009 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. 
Ct.], 2009Do10092, Jan. 28, 2010 (S. Kor.).
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by illegal interrogation, Article 4 of the CPPA to exclude communications 
by illegal wiretapping, and Article 308-2 of the CPC to exclude evidence 
obtained not through due process. 
Article 308-2 of the CPC, which provides that “evidence obtained not 
through due process shall not be admissible,”122) is a general provision for 
all exclusionary rules as well as a special provision for the exclusion of 
physical evidence by illegal search-and-seizure, which had no positive legal 
provision for exclusion. Whether to “violate substantial contents of due 
process” 123) will depend on judicial discretion. 
Article 308-2 as a general rule is generally used to exclude illegally taken 
photos or videotapes, evidence obtained by illegal entrapment, blood 
samples obtained without a warrant and statements obtained by illegal 
“voluntary accompaniment” and so forth. 
In 1999 the Supreme Court provided the standards for the legality of 
videotaping; “Warrantless videotaping is not illegal if it is done by 
generally permitted proper methods when crimes are on-going or just after 
a crime is committed, and it is urgently necessary to maintain evidence.” 124) 
In 2007 the Court also provided that the legality of entrapment should be 
decided by total estimation of the nature and response of targeted crimes, 
the role of the inducer, the process and method of inducement, the criminal 
career of the defendant and the legality of inducement itself.125) 
In 2007 the Court excluded the blood sample of a defendant obtained 
without a warrant.126) In this case, a police officer made a doctor take the 
blood of the defendant who lost consciousness after causing a car accident 
while driving under the influence of alcohol. In 2013 the Court also 
excluded the blood samples of defendants that were arrested illegally.127) In 
this case, in the scene of a car accident police officers arrested the defendant 
without informing him of the reasons for his arrest and right to counsel, 
122) Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 
amended by Act. No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012, art. 308-2 (S. Kor.).
123) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Do3061, Nov. 15, 2007 (S. Kor.).
124) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Do2317, Sept. 3, 1999 (S. Kor.).
125) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Do2339, July 12, 2007 (S. Kor.).
126) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Do2109, Apr. 28, 2011 (S. Kor.).
127) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Do2094, Mar. 14, 2013 (S. Kor.).
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which is required by Article 200-5 of the CPC. Although the defendant 
rejected the request of the police officers to comply by doing a breathalyzer 
test, they told him that if did not comply, he would be detained. Then the 
defendant complied with the test, which showed the criminalizing figure. 
The blood sample that was taken from him in the hospital also proves it. 
In 2011 the Supreme Court excluded the defendants’ statements 
obtained by illegal “voluntary accompaniment,” stating that “voluntary 
accompaniment” can be allowed only when police officers have informed 
defendants the right not to accompany or it is objectively and clearly 
recognized that defendants could have broken away from the 
accompaniment freely at any time. 128) 
Article 308-2 will also influence the application of Article 309 of the 
CPC. Even after the Korean version decisions of Miranda and Massiah129) 
were made, the traditional “voluntary test” to exclude confessions was not 
completely replaced. Article 308-2 clearly states that illegality, not 
voluntariness, is the standard to exclude confessions. It means that if 
confessions are obtained by illegal interrogation methods, they are 
presumed to be involuntary. Considering that Article 309 provides 
“confessions whose voluntariness is doubtful” shall be excluded, the 
“doubtfulness” is confirmed only when the investigative method during 
interrogation is found to be illegal. 
V. New Issues of the Exclusionary Rules
1. Changed and Unchanged
Twenty years after the establishment of the 1987 Constitution to the 
2007 revision of the Criminal Procedure Code, Korean criminal procedure 
has either strengthened or introduced new exclusionary rules to deter 
police misconduct. Although the legal surroundings of the Korean criminal 
justice system had totally changed, the old consciousness and illegal 
practice of the law enforcement authorities did not rapidly fade away. It 
128) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Do6717, June 30, 2011 (S. Kor.).
129) See supra text accompanying notes 53-71.
204 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 13: 175
would be naive to expect that police misconduct suddenly disappeared 
after the exclusionary rules were adopted in the criminal justice system. 
President Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993), who was a leader in the 1980 
military coup with Chun Doo-Hwan but who was elected as President by a 
direct election based on the 1987 Constitution, promised to prohibit torture 
and guarantee human rights in the criminal process. During the period of 
the Roh government, as reviewed, a series of groundbreaking decisions 
were made by the Supreme Court. President Kim Young Sam (1993-1998), 
who once was a leader of the democratization movement, merged his 
Unified Democratic Party with the ruling Democratic Justice Party led by 
Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae Woo under the authoritarian regime in 1990. 
President Kim Young Sam also criticized the criminal process, saying that 
torture and mistreatment by law enforcement authorities recurred, and 
emphasized that procedural rights of suspects should be guaranteed. The 
CPPA was legislated by President Kim’s initiative. The number of the 
reports of torture decreased since this political democratization.
However, it has been repeatedly reported that National Security Law 
violators were mistreated in the National Security Planning Agency. For 
instance, Yoo Won Ho, who visited North Korea- accompanying a leading 
reunification movement activist named Reverend Moon Ik Hwan- without 
the government’s permission in 1989, and Legislator Seo Kyung Won and 
his staff Bang Yang Kyoon, who visited North Korea without the 
government’s permission in 1988, were severely hit and deprived of sleep 
during interrogation. 130) Reunification activists such as Jamintong (Self-
reliance, Democracy, Reunification) and leftist activists such as Sanomaeng 
(Socialist Workers’ League) were also harshly treated by the National 
Security Planning Agency in 1990.131) However, the National Security 
Planning Agency’s investigating officers were not investigated at all.
The mistreatment of non-political suspects still went on during the 
period of the Roh and Kim governments. The most highly profiled case 
happened in Pusan North Police Station in 1993. Two suspects were 
arrested under the suspicion of killing an eight-year-old girl. The eyes of 
the suspects were covered by a towel, their mouths were gagged, and they 
130) See Park, supra note 23, at 275-78.
131) Id. at 275-78, 285-294.
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were handcuffed and beaten by fist and by bat in the police station. Thanks 
to the efforts of a local newspaper and human rights lawyers led by Moon 
Jae In, who was an opposition candidate in the 2013 presidential election, 
the truth was revealed and the police officers were convicted. 132)
In an interview with a magazine in 1994, Choe Hyung Woo, Minister of 
Internal Affairs under the Kim Young Sam government known as the 
“Civilian Government”, surprisingly said that those who are arrested for 
their leftist thought may be deprived of sleeping by the National Security 
Planning Agency.133) His remark was an explicit sign that sleep deprivation 
was not considered illegal. While torture by electricity or water seemed to 
disappear after political democratization, lower level torture such as 
beating and sleep deprivation was widely used in both political and non-
political cases. 
President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), a representative victim of 
authoritarian rule sentenced to death under the Chun Doo Hwan rule, was 
very active in guaranteeing human rights in criminal procedures. President 
Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008) was a leading human rights lawyer before 
becoming a politician. Since established in 2001, the National Human 
Rights Commission has actively worked to investigate the misconduct of 
law enforcement authorities. In 2003, the Ministry of Justice made the Rule 
for the Protection of Human Rights in Investigations.
However, illegal misconduct has lingered within the law enforcement 
agencies. Although the police have proudly considered themselves as a 
“stick for the people,” they have often played as a “stick to brandish 
towards people.” Let me introduce a few shocking cases. 
In 2000, it was reported that a suspect under suspicion of selling drugs 
was taken to a mountain and put into a pit and threatened with being 
buried alive by police officers. In an interrogation room he was given the 
“wings breaking” torture,134) which was widely used during authoritarian 
rule.135) Probably the most serious misconduct in the history of the 
132) Id. at 383-85.
133) Id. at 342.
134) By the “wing-breaking,” the two arms of suspects are moved to their back and 
handcuffed, then lifted. 
135) Chosun Ilbo, May 16, 2000 ; Hankyoreh, May 16, 2000, http://news.naver.com/
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Prosecutors’ Office occurred in 2002. A suspect of the murder of a gang 
boss died after being beaten by law enforcement officers in the Seoul 
Prosecutors’ Office. The National Human Rights Commission found that 
suspects, including the deceased, were deprived of sleep, were beaten and 
were forced to drink water. They were also forced to do “Wonsan 
bombing”,136) which was commonly used during authoritarian rule. The 
officers and Hong Kyung Ryung, who as a prosecutor directed them to 
torture suspects, was convicted, and the Minister of Justice, Attorney 
General and Head of the Seoul Prosecutors’ Office resigned.137) “A 
prosecutor has become a monster to catch an organized criminal.”138) In 
2010, the National Human Rights Commission filed a charge against police 
officers after investigating their severe torture of suspects in the Seoul 
Yangcheon Police Station, and they were convicted.139) Their mouths were 
stuffed by paper tissues or towels, and suspects suffered from the “wing-
breaking” torture,140) which was widely used during authoritarian rule. 
These shocking incidents revealed that illegal interrogation practices 
have surreptitiously survived although substantially decreased in 
contemporary Korean society.
2. Application of Exceptions to the Exclusion―Rule with Weak Teeth?
After the 2007 Supreme Court’s decision and the 2007 revision of the 
CPC, the Supreme Court dealt with the exceptions to the search-and-
seizure exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. The 
decision of March 12, 2009 is important.141) In this case, an arrested robbery 
defendant made an incriminatory statement regarding victims in a police 
main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=020&aid=0000003552 
136) By the “Wonsan bombing,” the two arms of suspects are moved to their back and 
their head is located on the floor, then suspects shore up their body by their head and toes. 
Wonsan is a city of North Korea.
137) ChanG Won pyo, junGeiei juCKdle 278-284 (2014).
138) Id. at 278.
139) Ki soo lee, huWijabaeKei eronGa silje 192-93 (2012).
140) By the “wing-breaking,” the two arms of suspects are moved to their back and 
handcuffed, then lifted. 
141) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do11437, Mar. 12, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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car without being given the warning of the right to silence. Based on this 
statement, the police officer seized the victim’s materials, including her bag 
in the defendant’s residence. Later, being given the warning of the right to 
silence, the defendant voluntarily confessed his crime. The defendant 
admitted to his crime in trial.
In trial, the prosecutor argued that exceptions to the exclusionary rule 
are applicable. However, the Seoul Seobu District Court rejected it.142) First, 
the Court excluded the defendant’s statement in a police car for it was 
obtained without the Miranda warning. Second, the Court rejected the 
prosecutor’s argument of “inevitable discovery exception”143) that without 
the defendant’ statement the seized materials could have been obtained 
based on the defendant’s consent or by emergent search-and-seizure in 
Article 217(1) of the CPC. The Court also rejected the prosecutor’s 
argument of a “good faith exception” 144) that the police officer had good 
faith that he could legally search and seize the defendant’s residence by 
Article 217(1) of the CPC, for the defendant was under emergent arrest. The 
Court held that it is hard to find the defendant’s consent when the 
requirements for Article 217(1) are not fulfilled either. Third, the Court 
excluded the victim’s materials for they were tainted evidence derived from 
the illegally obtained statements. Deciding that the “taint” in the derivative 
evidence was not “purged”, so “the purged taint exception”145) was not 
applicable, the Court held the defendant guilty based on his admission in a 
trial. 
However, this decision was overthrown by the Seoul High Court’s 
142) See Seoul Seobu District Court, 2008Kohap71, Jul. 10, 2008.
143) This exception originates from Nix. v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431(1984). The Court held 
that evidence obtained through the illegal police conduct might be admissible if it would 
“inevitably” have been discovered by other independent lawful means.
144) This exception originates from U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Court held that 
evidence need not be excluded when police had obtained the evidence through objective good 
faith reliance on “a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately 
found to be unsupported by probable cause.” Id. at 913.
145) His exception originates from Won Sun v. U.S., 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court stated 
that the applicability of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is determined by “whether, 
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is 
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”
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decision, deciding the victim’s materials as derivative evidence should not 
be excluded.146) Confirming the High Court’s decision, the Supreme Court 
provided more specific standards than in its 2007 decision to decide 
whether to exclude “tainted fruits.” It requested “comprehensive 
evaluation of all the circumstances regarding the collection of the first 
tainted evidence: the purpose of process-related provisions, the content, 
degree, reason of process violation, the possibility of avoiding the violation, 
the nature and violated degree of rights or legal interests that process-
related provisions intend to protect, the causation between process 
violation and evidence collection, the willfulness or negligence of law 
enforcement officers, and all situations that additionally happened when 
collecting the derivative evidence.”147) 
Then, the Supreme Court found “dilution or severance of the causation 
between the first illegal evidence and the derivative evidence”148) in this 
case. The Supreme Court believed that the failure to give the Miranda 
warnings was a “mistake, not intentional”149) and focused on the fact that in 
the subsequent interrogation the warning was given, and the defendant 
made confessions again with the aid of his counsel.150) 
The author stands by the Seoul High Court. First, it is very lenient to 
estimate that the failure of warning is simply a “mistake.” Considering the 
Miranda warnings were well informed among the police community after 
the 1992 Supreme Court decision, it is reasonable to doubt either “mistake” 
or “good faith” of the police officer and to conclude that the failure to give 
the Miranda warnings was deliberate or reckless at least. It is assumed that 
the Supreme Court might refer to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision of 
Oregon v. Elstad,151) which held that the second confession obtained after 
giving proper Miranda warnings was not tainted fruit on the grounds that it 
was derived from the first confession obtained without Miranda warnings. 
The main rationale was that the violation of the Miranda warnings was not 
146) See Seoul High Court 2008No1954, Nov. 20, 2008.




151) Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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a violation of the Constitution itself.152) However, in Korea, it is a direct and 
grave violation of both the Constitution and the CPC for a police officer not 
to warn a suspect of his or her rights. 
Second, it is very naïve to find “dilution or severance of the causation” 
in this case. Unless the victim’s materials are excluded in this case, law 
enforcement authorities are likely to first elicit incriminatory statements 
from a suspect without giving the warning, and then give the warning 
later. This will weaken the right to silence substantially. 
In this sense, the Supreme Court decision of March 12, 2009 
foreshadows that the search-and-seizure exclusionary rule will not have 
strong teeth in practice, and that the Supreme Court will follow the 
conservative U.S. Burger-Rehnquist Court rather than the liberal Warren 
Court.
3.  Should Interrogation Stop when the Right to Silence or Counsel is 
Invoked by Suspects?― “Duty to Submit to Questioning”?
Although the Korean Supreme Court established the Korean versions of 
Miranda and Massiah, there remains unclear parts of these decisions, that is, 
whether or not a custodial interrogation may be reinitiated once the suspect 
has invoked his right to remain silent or to have an attorney present at the 
interrogation. In practice, Korean law enforcement authorities do not stop 
questioning even after the suspects have invoked their rights. This practice 
has not been challenged in a trial yet. 
Korean law enforcement authorities act as if a “duty to submit to 
questioning”(取調受忍義務) is imposed on suspects. Such a duty does not 
exist in the CPC at all, while it is stipulated in Article 198 (1) of the Japanese 
Criminal Procedure Code. This Japanese Article provides that “except in 
cases where the suspect is under arrest or in detention, the suspect may 
refuse to appear or, having appeared, may leave at any time.” To read 
Article 198 (1) literally, the suspect’s right to refuse to appear for 
152) The U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Tucker held that the Miranda requirements 
were not right against compulsory selfincrimination but merely “prophylactic rules” to 
protect that right; thus disregard of the Miranda rules did not constitute a core violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (emphasis added).
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questioning and to leave apply only to those not under arrest or in 
detention. In actual practice, therefore, if suspects under arrest or in 
detention invoke their rights to silence, they are not allowed to leave the 
interrogation room; rather, they must be present and listen to questioning. 
The majority of Japanese academics have criticized that the “duty to submit 
to questioning” substantially forces suspects to answer despite the 
constitutional guarantee of the right to silence. Japanese law enforcement 
authorities have strongly adhered to the literal interpretation and the 
Japanese Supreme Court has not made a decision on this issue.153) 
This is in salient contrast to Miranda, which makes it clear that suspects 
have an absolute right to silence and that all questioning must cease 
immediately when a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or right to 
counsel.154)  The subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Miranda and 
Massiah also held that interrogation should stop once suspects have 
invoked their right to silence or counsel. For instance, the Court in Edward 
v. Arizona held:  
“An accused, such as a petitioner, having expressed his desire to 
deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless 
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police. ... when an accused has invoked his 
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid 
waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he 
responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if 
he has been advised of his rights.”155)
In Minnick v. Mississippi,156) the Court also held that once a suspect had 
invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, police could not reinitiate 
interrogation unless counsel was present at the reinitiation, even if the 
153) See Kuk Cho, Japanese “Prosecutorial Justice” and Its Limited Exclusionary Rule, 12 
Colum j. asian l. 1, 57-58 (1998).
154) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
155) Edward v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (emphasis added).
156) Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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suspect had consulted with counsel. 
Recently in Montejo v. Louisiana,157) the Court modified its previous stern 
position by overruling Michigan v. Jackson.158) Montejo was charged with 
first-degree murder and appointed court-ordered counsel, which he neither 
expressly requested nor denied. Later that day, while in prison, police read 
Montejo his Miranda rights and he voluntarily accompanied the police to 
the site where the murder weapon was located. While in the police car 
without counsel present, he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the 
victim’s widow. At trial, the letter of apology was admitted over the 
defense’s objections, and Montejo was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court rejected the defense’s claim that the 
letter should have been suppressed since Montejo stood mute at his hearing 
while the judge ordered the appointment of counsel. In Berghuis v. 
Thompkins,159) it also established that the mere act of remaining silent is not 
sufficient to imply that the suspect has invoked his or her right to silence; 
only when a suspect unambiguously invoked his Miranda right to counsel 
should police cease questioning. 
Although these two cases certainly weakened Miranda and Massiah, it 
has not changed that police are forbidden to initiate interrogation of a 
criminal defendant once he has clearly invoked his right to counsel. 
In this context, the Korean versions of Miranda and Massiah do not have 
as strong a bite as the U.S. originals. As reviewed below,160) state attorneys 
for the indigent are not available during police interrogation before 
prosecution. To most suspects, therefore, right to silence is the only weapon 
with which to confront law enforcement authorities. Because of the Korean 
law enforcement authorities’ practices, however, suspects who have 
invoked their right to silence have to endure repeated questioning by the 
police during the period of their arrest or detention, and suspects who have 
invoked their right to silence also have to until their counsel arrives. In this 
157) Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
158) “[I]f police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or 
similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for 
that policeinitiated interrogation is invalid.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
159) Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
160) See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
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situation, there is a high possibility for suspects to waive their rights to 
silence or counsel. 
4.  Institutional Limit of the Right to Have a Counsel Participate in 
Interrogation
As reviewed,161) the “right to have a counsel participate in interrogation” 
was codified in the CPC in 2007. However, only in one percent of cases 
among all criminal cases do counsels participate.162)
Private lawyers are not willing to participate in interrogation, for their 
participation does not get them additional charges in most cases. State-
appointed attorneys for the indigent are available only to defendants after 
prosecution. During police interrogation before prosecution the right to 
have a counsel participate in interrogation can be enjoyed only by a small 
number of propertied suspects. The U.S. public defender system is not 
available in Korea. Although each regional Bar Association provides a duty 
solicitor for the indigent suspect, its coverage is very limited. It is also very 
rare for a duty solicitor to participate in interrogation. 
As a result, most poor suspects have to go through interrogation alone 
and the gap between the rich and the poor in the enjoyment of the right to 
counsel gets bigger. It is a new task for the Korean criminal justice to reduce 
or remove this gap, depending on the public’s recognition of the 
importance of the right to counsel and the budget for a new system for the 
indigent. 
5. Consent of One of the Parties of Electronic Communication
Since the CPPA was legislated, the question has remained whether or 
not the consent by one of the parties of electronic communication can 
justify its interception. This question is raised in the two settings below; (i) 
law enforcement authorities secretly record their electronic communication 
161) See supra text accompanying notes 77-82. 
162) See Nullified attorney’s right to participate in suspect interrogation, Beopryul 
Shinmoon, Dec. 7, 2012,  http://www.lawtimes.co.kr/LawNews/News/NewsContents.
aspx?serial=69887&kind=AE (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
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with others without a warrant, (ii) private persons secretly record their 
electronic communication with others.
Dealing with the second type of setting, the Supreme Court held that 
such interceptions are not illegal. In the decision of October 8, 2002, with an 
intent to file a charge for legal breach of the owner of a rival beauty parlor, 
the defendant instructed a person to call his rival and record their 
conversation. The Court held that the secret recording of telephone 
communication by one party of the communication is not illegal.163) This 
decision was based on the concept that either party of electronic 
communication takes the risk that the other party may secretly record the 
communication. 
This 2002 decision has been criticized, saying that secret recordings of 
electronic communications only by the consent of one party of the 
communication violates the non-consenting party’s right to control his/her 
words, so it is illegal;164) prohibited wiretapping is defined as obtainment of 
electronic communication without consent of a party, and a ‘party’ here 
includes all parties of the communication.165)
The Supreme Court has not held that this decision is also applicable to 
the first type of setting. If so, law enforcement authorities may freely obtain 
electronic communication of suspects without judicial control. In the 
Decision of Oct. 14, 2010, the Court held that secret recording of mobile 
phone communication by police informant, who was imprisoned at that 
time and given the phone by the police, is illegal.166) 
6. Evidences Illegally Obtained By a Private Person
Traditionally exclusionary rules were to deter the misconduct of law 
enforcement authorities,167) including Article 308-2 of the CPC to exclude 
evidence obtained not through due process and Article 309 of the CPC to 
163) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Do123, Oct. 8, 2002 (S. Kor.).
164) Bae et al., supra note 50, at 99.
165) Shin, supra note 35, at 457.
166) See Decision of Oct. 14, 2010, 2010 Do 9016 [Korean Supreme Court].
167) The U.S. Supreme Court has also taken the same position since Burdeau v. 
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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exclude statements obtained by illegal interrogation. Certainly, if private 
persons illegally collect evidence by cooperating with law enforcement 
authorities, their acts are regarded as law enforcement authorities’ acts.168)
As reviewed,169) however, the CPPA prohibits anyone, including private 
persons as well as law enforcement officers, from committing illegal 
inspection of letters, wiretapping electronic communications, and recording 
or eavesdropping on conversations between others. So evidence obtained 
by a private person who violates the CPPA shall be excluded. This shows 
that communication privacy is much more protected than basic rights in 
criminal procedures in Korea.
Recently there were a number of cases where a private person without 
cooperating with law enforcement authorities illegally collected evidence to 
use in litigation or to threaten people. This person will be punished by law. 
The issue here is whether the evidence may be used in a trial.
In the decision of September 30, 1997 the Supreme Court dealt first with 
this controversial issue. 170)  In this case, the defendant was accused of 
adultery by her husband.171) Nude photographs of the defendant, which her 
adulterer took with her consent, were seized by the police and submitted to 
the court. Her adulterer hid his intent to use the photos to blackmail her 
when taking them.
The Seoul District Court held that the photos should be excluded, for 
they violated the “core part of the right of personality of the defendant,”172) 
stating:
“If photos of a person are taken against the person’s will or while 
the person does not know that the photos are used for criminal 
activities, even taken by a private person and not by state 
authorities, they violate the person’s right of personality or likeness 
seriously, and so should be excluded. It is a new violation of the 
168) Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
169) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Do229, Mar. 9, 2001 (S. Kor.); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
170) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 97Do1230, Sept. 30, 1997 (S. Kor.).
171) Adultery is criminalized in Korea. See Kuk Cho, Crime of Adultery in Korea: Inadequate 
Means for Maintaining Morality and Protecting Women, 2 j. Korean l. 1 (2002).
172) See Seoul District Court [Dist. Ct.], 96Ga-Hap5541, Apr. 9, 1997 (S. Kor.).
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person’s fundamental right for state authorities to use the photos 
taken by a private person for an unjust purpose as evidence.”173)
This is the first judicial case in Korea excluding evidence improperly 
obtained by a private person. It is assumed that the Seoul District Court 
borrowed the concept of the “core part of the right of personality” from the 
German Federal Constitutional Court decision of 1973,174) which excluded a 
conversation of tax fraud secretly recorded by private persons about the 
defendant.175)
However, the Supreme Court quashed the District Court’s decision.176) 
The Supreme Court held:
“All evidence related to the private areas of people should not 
always be prohibited to submit. Balancing between the public 
interests of effective prosecution and truth finding in the criminal 
process and the interests of individuals’ private lives, the Court 
decides whether to permit the submission. The Court can avoid the 
violation of human dignity of the people by choosing a proper 
method of evidence investigation. It is easily confirmed that the 
photos in this case were taken with the defendant’s consent, so the 
existence of the photos do not violate the defendant’s right of 
personality or likeness. Even supposing that the adulterer had the 
intent to blackmail the defendant, the photos may not be regarded as 
having been taken involuntarily….Even if the submission of the 
photos may infringe the secrets of the defendant’s private life; it is a 
173) Id. 
174) Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 31, 1973, 34 
BVerfGE 238 (Ger.).
175) In this case, the defendant was accused of tax fraud by making other persons’ real 
property price on contract lower than the actual price for tax purposes and of receiving the 
difference in cash from the owners. The owners secretly tape-recorded conversations between 
the defendant and themselves relating to the tax fraud, and subsequently submitted the tape 
to the police on their own initiative. See  Kuk Cho, “Procedural Weakness” of German Criminal 
Justice and Its Unique Exclusionary Rules Based on the Right of Personality, 15 temp. int’l & Comp. 
l. j. 1, 24-25 (2001).
176) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 97Do1230, Sept. 30, 1997 (S. Kor.).
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limitation of the basic right that the defendant should endure.” 177)
In the decision of November 28, 2013,178)  the Supreme Court reviewed 
the same issue. In this case, the defendant who was a public official of the 
City of Milyang, developed an election campaign for the Mayor of Milyag, 
which is a violation of the Public Election Law. Another official obtained 
the defendant’s emails illegally by removing the protection system for 
emails, which were submitted to prosecutors. The Court held that the 
emails may be used to convict the defendant, pointing out that the 
defendant’s crime is very serious, his emails have public elements, and the 
defendant consented to use them as evidence in a trial. 179)
In these two cases, taking the balancing test, the Supreme Court did not 
completely block the chance in theory for excluding evidence improperly 
obtained by a private person. However, the Court is not expected to be 
eager to exclude such evidence. When a due process violation by a private 
person is taken much more seriously, the German Court’s approach will be 
adopted in Korea.
VI. Conclusion
Under authoritarian rule, Miranda, Massiah and Mapp were totally 
alienated from the Korean criminal procedure. Very few academics and 
lawyers knew their meaning. Wiretapping was seriously abused without 
any restriction. Since democratization, exclusionary rules have been 
received one after another in Korea from across the Pacific, although they 
are often criticized as truth impairing and pro-criminal in their home 
country.180) The Korean judiciary and legislature that experienced the dark 
177) Id.
178) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do12244, Nov. 28, 2013 (S. Kor.).
179) Id. 
180) See off. of leGal pol’y & dep’t of justiCe, ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Series Office of 
Legal Policy: The Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 u. miCh. j. l. reform 437, 535-36 & 618 (1989); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Twenty-fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Foreward: Sixth Amendment 
First Principles, 84 Geo. l. j. 641, 644 (1996). See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, 
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 miCh. l. reV. 857 (1995); 
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age of procedural rights under a long authoritarian rule chose to adopt the 
exclusionary rules as a useful tool to deter police misconduct, which has 
persistently lingered even after political democratization. The institutional 
surroundings of the newly established rules are still advantageous to law 
enforcement authorities. However, it is certain that the rules cannot be 
explicitly rejected by the law enforcement authorities. Now the police are 
officially requested to adjust themselves to these laws. Although the 
exclusionary rules alone cannot enhance the guarantee of an individual’s 
procedural rights, they provide legal grounds for individual suspects to 
challenge police misconduct. 
The groundbreaking legal reform after democratization does not 
automatically lead to a change in the behavior of law enforcement 
authorities. Even after the reform, law enforcement authorities tacitly praise 
“Confession est regina probationum” and emphasize the superiority of crime 
control over due process, seeking for a detour to avoid the exclusionary 
rules. They made administrative rules to limit the reach of judicial decisions 
and the 2007 revision of the CPC. They argue that the exceptions to the 
exclusionary rules should apply to their conduct. In this context, a new 
tension between crime control and due process in new legal circumstances 
has just begun.
joseph d. Grano, Confessions, truth, and the laW (1993).

